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On the equivalence between sharing quantum and classical secrets, and error correction
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We present a general scheme for sharing quantum secrets, and an extension to sharing classical secrets, which
contain all known quantum secret sharing schemes. In this framework we show the equivalence of existence of
both schemes, that is, the existence of a scheme sharing a quantum secret implies the extended classical secret
sharing scheme works, and vice versa. As a consequence of this we find new schemes sharing classical secrets
for arbitrary access structures. We then clarify the relationship to quantum error correction and observe several
restrictions thereby imposed, which for example indicates that for pure state threshold schemes the share size
q must scale with the number of players n as q ≥ √n. These results also provide a new way of searching for
quantum error correcting codes.
Secret sharing [1] is an important primitive in information
networks, for example in online auctions, electronic voting,
secure multiparty function evaluation. The problem setting
is that a dealer d wishes to distribute a secret (we will con-
sider both classical and quantum secrets) to a set of n play-
ers, such that only certain sets of players can access the secret
(we call these the authorised sets of players). The sets that
do not have access to any information about the secret are
called the unauthorised sets. The assignement of authorised
sets is the access structure. Any such scheme can be loosely
described as a ramp scheme, written in terms of three param-
eters, (k, k′, n), where any set of players B such that |B| ≥ k
can access the secret, whereas any set such that |B| ≤ k′ can-
not get any information at all. Clearly in general this descrip-
tion does not cover the full access structure in between k and
k′. When k′ = k− 1, it does however, and this is called a per-
fect threshold scheme, denoted (k, n), perfect because a sub-
set is either authorised or unauthorised, and threshold because
no subset of cardinality less than k − 1 is authorised. In this
work when we refer to threshold schemes we assume perfect
schemes also, although this is not an assumption always made
in the literature (e.g. [2]). Often it suffices to consider thresh-
old schemes (k, n), since all access structure can be built from
them ([2, 3]), although the efficiency of such schemes is not
always optimal ([4]).
We consider two quantum extensions of the secret sharing
problem, first put forward in [5, 6], which have found applica-
tion, for example, in secure multiparty quantum computation
[7]. The first is the sharing of a quantum secret [5, 6], that
is, the dealer wishes to distribute a quantum state such that
only authorised sets of players can access it, and unauthorised
sets cannot. We refer to this protocol family as QQ (following
the notation of [8]). It was shown in [6] that all threshold not
contradicting no-cloning can be achieved. Here we will see
that whilst this is true, error correction implies severe restric-
tions on how this can be done in particular in the dimension of
the systems used. The second quantum version we consider
is the sharing of a classical secret using quantum channels,
introduced in [5]. This family of protocols is referred to as
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CQ [8]. It is known that there exist informationally theoreti-
cally secure schemes to share a classical secret [1], however,
these schemes require a secure channel between the dealer and
each player. One way of resolving this issue would be to use
n quantum key distribution (QKD) channels from the dealer,
one to each player, and then use the Shamir scheme. Another
way, presented in [5] combines the idea of QKD with secret
sharing directly. By choosing a suitable entangled state shared
between the dealer and the players, the dealer is able to share a
private (secure) key with the players such that only authorised
players can access the key. We refer to protocols taking this
second approach as RCQ (transmission of a Random Classical
key with a multiparty Quantum state or channel). The existing
RCQ schemes to date are threshold schemes with parameters
(n, n)[5], (3, 5) [8] and (2, 3) [9] [10]. Although these RCQ
schemes may be less practical because of the entanglement
than the simple QKD schemes, we study them here for two
main reasons. First, we believe these schemes are of intrinsic
interest, with potential as building blocks of more elaborate
protocols, and moreover second, through the relationship we
present they can be useful to search for new QQ and error
correcting schemes. We finally remark that we are not con-
sidering explicitly the CC protocols of [8], corresponding to
the simple sharing of a classical secret with a quantum state,
though many connections to QQ can be carried through the
equivalence to RCQ.
In [8, 9] a link was presented between QQ and RCQ pro-
tocols where it was shown that in some instances the same
framework could be used for both using graph states. The
usefulness of this connection is many fold. On a practical
level sharing the same framework is advantageous since any
implementation for one can be adapted to perform the other.
On the theoretical level the advantages are very rich. On the
one hand it allows new RCQ schemes to be found via trans-
lation from QQ, as in [8, 9]. In the other direction, tech-
niques for constructing RCQ schemes (which can often on the
face of it appear much simpler) can be used to construct QQ
schemes. Furthermore there is a deep relationship between
QQ and quantum error correction. For example, it was shown
in [12] that for qubit system, there is a (restricted) equiva-
lence between QQ protocols based on graph states and CSS
stabilizer codes [6, 13]. This opens up the door to the pos-
sibility of using powerful tools from error correction theory
2to investigate secret sharing, and techniques from secret shar-
ing to find error correcting codes. Graph state methods have
recently yielded many results in this direction [11, 14, 15].
The main topic of this work is to give a general relationship
between between error correction, QQ and RCQ secret shar-
ing, which will complete previous results. We will develop
this connection to show equivalence of schemes, which will
lead to new RCQ schemes, tighter security of RCQ schemes,
and bounds on what QQ schemes are possible, as well as pro-
viding a different approach to searching for error correcting
codes.
In this work we present the most general QQ secret shar-
ing scheme for sharing a quantum secret and its extension to
a RCQ scheme, which formally encompass all quantum ex-
isting secret sharing schemes. We show that the existence of
such a QQ implies the extension to RCQ case has the same ac-
cess structure, and similarly, if there exists a RCQ scheme of
this type, the quantum version is also a valid QQ secret shar-
ing scheme (propositions 1 and 2). This allows us to use the
QQ schemes from [6] for the extended RCQ scheme, allowing
all access structures (not violating the no cloning theorem).
The equivalence further allows for security amongst autho-
rised sets for the RCQ scheme. We then clarify the equiva-
lence between the secret sharing protocols and quantum error
correction, showing that all ramp schemes are error correcting
schemes and vice versa. Several restrictions are thus imposed
from the theory of error correction, notably, that for pure state
QQ threshold schemes, the size of the share must scale with
the size of the network (something which is also true in the
fully classical setting).
We start in the next section by describing the protocols.
Then in section II we give precise definitions of the require-
ments of authorised and unauthorised sets in terms of the in-
formation that can obtain. In section III we show how the QQ
and RCQ schemes are related to each other, summarized in ta-
ble I. Then in section IV we elaborate on the relationship with
error correction and finish with discussions in section V.
I. QQ AND RCQ SECRET SHARING PROTOCOLS
The most general QQ quantum secret sharing protocol can
be understood as a map from a quantum secret state of dimen-
sion q, |ζ〉 = ∑q−1i=0 αi|i〉 to a multipartite state |ζL〉1...n =∑q−1
i=0 αi|iL〉1...n, shared between the players 1...n, encoded
onto some logical basis {|iL〉1...n}, which is designed such
that authorised sets of players can access the secret and unau-
thorised sets of players cannot. Without loss of generality we
take {|iL〉} to be an orthonormal basis. An encoding onto a
non-orthogonal basis can be understood as some preprocess-
ing taking the state input |ζ〉 to a state |ζ′〉 corresponding to the
non-orthogonal encoding, and then following the map above.
A mixed state encoding can always be purified into a map as
above, followed by tracing out of some systems (in which case
the number of active players would be less than n, we discuss
such examples and their relation to our results in section IV).
In this way this encoding formally represents the most general
scheme.
For any such scheme, we extend to RCQ sharing classical
secrets by introducing what we call a channel state between
system d held by the dealer and the players’ systems 1...n,
which can be thought of as the dealer preparing a maximally
entangled state and sending half through the encoding above,
|CS〉d,1...n := 1√
q
q−1∑
i=0
|i〉d|iL〉1...n. (1)
This is a maximally entangled state between d and the play-
ers, and can be understood as a channel from the dealer to the
players. In the QQ case this channel is used to teleport the
secret from the dealer’s qubit to the players (that is, it acts
simply as an encoding process for the most general scheme).
In the RCQ case this channel is used to establish a secure ran-
dom key between the dealer and the players (as per the Ekert
quantum key distribution protocol [16]). In both cases it is
the choice of the logical basis {|iL〉1...n} gives rise to the ac-
cess structure. The RCQ extension we present using this idea
covers all known RCQ schemes [5, 8, 9] (up to possible re-
ordering of public communication steps, e.g. [17]).
For the RCQ extension it will be useful to define general-
ized Pauli operators, that are for prime dimension q, X |i〉 =
|i + 1〉, Z|i〉 = ωi|i〉, where ω = ei2pi/q , and q is the dimen-
sion of the secret. For the moment we will consider prime
dimensional case and later we will see how the results also
work for non-prime dimension. We further denote |i(t)〉 as
the eigenstates of XtZ for t ∈ {0, ..., q− 1} and as the eigen-
state of X for t = q. The channel state can then be expanded
as
|CS〉d,1...n = 1√
q
q−1∑
i=0
|i(t)〉d|i(t)L〉1...n,
where the bases {|i(t)L〉} are also orthonormal and comple-
mentary, that is |〈i(t)L|j(t′)L〉|2 = 1/q when t 6= t′.
We will first describe the protocols, then make precise what
we mean exactly by authorised and unauthorised sets for both
QQ and RCQ, and security for the RCQ protocol in section II.
QQ Protocol: Let |ζ〉d′ =
∑q−1
i=0 αi|i〉d′ ∈ Cq be the secret
state in possession of the dealer.
1. The dealer prepares a channel state (1), then does an ex-
tended Bell measurement over d and d′ and appropriate
corrections, leaving the state of the n qudits as
|ζL〉1...n =
q−1∑
i=0
αi|iL〉1...n. (2)
2. The dealer sends qudit ℓ of the resultant state to player
ℓ.
3. Players in authorised set B follow a prescribed decod-
ing operation ΓB .
3The protocol is then defined by encoding basis {|iL〉1...n},
and decoding operations ΓB for each authorised set B. More
concretely, ΓB maps the reduced density matrix ρζB =
TrV/B(|ζL〉〈ζL|) on the systems of B, onto the secret state
|ζ〉b′ on some system b′. ΓB may be a global operation over
systems B (plus possible ancilla systems) and b′ may in B, or
some ancilla (see Fig. 1).
RCQ Protocol: The RCQ protocol does not directly dis-
tribute a secret classical message from the dealer to the play-
ers, rather it is a protocol to establish a secure key between
the dealer and the players, such that only authorised sets of
players can access the key. In this sense it may be considered
more accurately as secret key sharing. This key can then be
used by the dealer to share a secret message such that it can
only be read by authorised sets of players. The RCQ protocol
is an extension of those presented in [5, 8, 9], to the more gen-
eral case not necessarily using graph states. We now outline
the protocol.
1. The dealer prepares a channel state (1) and sends qudit
ℓ to player ℓ.
2. The dealer randomly chooses a t ∈ {0, ..., q} and mea-
sures qudit d among the bases: {XtZ}q−1t=0 for t ∈
{0, ..., q − 1} or X if t = q. We denote the result r(t).
The state of the players is then projected to
|r(t)L〉1...n. (3)
3. An authorised set B randomly measures in one of the
prescribed measurements {M t′B}qt′=0, with result de-
noted s(t′).
4. Repeat step 1. 2. 3. m → ∞ times. The list of mea-
surement results r(t) and s(t′) are the raw keys of the
dealer and players B respectively.
5. SECURITY TEST: Follow standard QKD security steps
(see e.g. [20]). Through public discussion between d
and B first sift the key followed by standard error cor-
rection and privacy amplification to generate a secure
key.
The protocol is defined by encoding basis {|iL〉1...n}, and
measurements {M t′B}qt′=0 for each authorised set B. At the
end, if the protocol is not aborted during the security step, the
dealer and the authorised set share a secure key which can be
used to distribute a classical secret securely.
II. AUTHORISED AND UNAUTHORISED SETS AND
SECURITY
We now define what it means to say sets of players are au-
thorised or unauthorised for both RCQ and QQ protocols. For
later proofs comparing the two protocols it will be useful to
also talk about equivalent information theoretic conditions.
For this we define the channel ΛB from system d′ to subset
of players B as the encoding procedure in QQ giving state (2)
followed by tracing out all but the players B (see Fig. 1).
We first look at the QQ case.
QQ Authorised sets We say a set of players B is authorised
if they can perfectly access the quantum secret, that is, if there
exists a decoding procedure ΓB acting only on those players,
which can perfectly recover the secret input state |ζ〉.
If the quantum information is accessible through the
channel ΛB , then the quantum mutual information be-
tween two halves of a maximally entangled state after
one half has been sent down the channel is maxi-
mal [19]. That is to say I(τ ; ΛB) = 2 log2 q, where
I(τ ; ΛB) = S(τ) + S(ΛB(τ)) − S((id ⊗ ΛB)(|Φq〉〈Φq|)),
τ = 1q
∑q−1
i=0 |i〉〈i| is a maximally mixed state,
|Φq〉 = 1q
∑q−1
i=0 |ii〉 is a maximally entangled state and
S is the Von Neuman entropy (S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log(ρ))).
QQ Unauthorised sets We say a set of players B is
unauthorised if it has no access to the quantum secret what-
soever, that is, the reduced density matrix ρB is independent
of the quantum input |ζ〉. Information theoretically, this
corresponds to I(τ ; ΛB) = 0.
We now look at the RCQ protocol.
RCQ Authorised sets We say a set of players B is authorised
if it can access the secret, that is, if after the dealer has dis-
tributed the channel state (1) and measured it (up to step 2 in
the protocol), there exists a (possibly joint) measurement on
their systems which allows them to discover the dealers mea-
surement result r(t) for each setting t.
To rewrite this in information theoretic language, it suffices
to consider the channel from the dealer to the playersB, where
for each t, the dealer sends a specific chosen state |r(t)L〉1...n
to the players encoding the classical information r(t), chosen
according to a uniform distribution. The ability, or not, of a
set of players to access this classical information is equiva-
lent to them being able to discover the dealer’s measurement
result in the RCQ protocol. In terms of the action of the chan-
nel ΛB above, this corresponds to a set of inputs {U t|i〉}q−1i=0 ,
where U is a fourier transform of rank q, t ∈ [q]. That is,
each |r(t)L〉1...n, corresponds to an input state U t|r〉d′ . Thus
to verify that this channel works perfectly for each such mes-
sage, we are interested in the classical information that can be
transmitted for a random distribution over the alphabet for a
given t, which we denote Et = { 1q , U t|i〉}q−1i=0 . We use Holevo
information defined over a quantum channel ΛB by :
χ(ΛB(Et)) = S
(1
q
∑
i
ΛB(U
t|i〉〈i|U t†)
)
−1
q
∑
i
S(ΛB(U
t|i〉〈i|U t†)).
If the classical information is accessible through the quan-
tum channel ΛB perfectly, then the Holevo information
χ(Et(ΛB)) = log q, which must be true for all t, for all
authorised sets B.
RCQ Unauthorised sets We say a set of players B is
unauthorised if the dealer’s result r(t) is completely denied
to them, that is, if the reduced state ρB of those systems has
4no dependence on r(t) for all t. In information theoretic
terms, for the channel ΛB and the set of inputs above, this is
equal to saying that χ(ΛB(Et)) = 0 for all t.
RCQ Security For RCQ protocols there is the addi-
tional condition of security. We say an authorised set B is
secure if the key generated by the protocol between dealer
d and players B is perfectly secure. Note, that in order
not to impose potentially impossible restrictions on B’s
measurements, in these schemes a set B is treated as one
party, hence security is not guaranteed against cheaters within
the set B. We expect such cheats can be overcome for all
graph state schemes, but leave it to further work. As with all
QKD schemes, an authenticated classical channel between
d and B is required. Security will be shown against general
attacks in a way which tolerates noise, as shown for a qudit
extension of the Ekert protocol in [20]. Previously security
was only shown against intercept resend attacks [5, 8, 9]
(although to some extent cheating players within B could be
tolerated).
Figure 1: (Color online)Schematic of the QQ scheme. A dealer en-
codes a secret state |ζ〉d′ onto n parties (2). After tracing out of other
systems to get ρζLB (together with the encoding denoted by map ΛB),
authorised players B perform map ΓB to recover the secret.
III. EQUIVALENCE OF QQ AND RCQ
We now explore the relationship between the existence of
protocols for RCQ and QQ as described above.
For the QQ and RCQ schemes defined as above from a
channel state |CS〉, with logical basis {|iL〉}, the following
relationships hold.
Proposition 1.
1. A QQ authorised set, is a RCQ authorised set.
2. A QQ unauthorised set is a RCQ unauthorised set.
3. A RCQ authorised set is a QQ authorised set.
Proof: 1 and 2 are clear since the access of the classical
information is a special case of the quantum information. We
directly deduce 3 from the lemma 1 of [21], which says that
χ(ΛB(E0)) + χ(ΛB(E1)) ≤ I(τ : ΛB). (4)
If a set B can access in the RCQ protocol, after go-
ing through the associated quantum channel ΛB, the clas-
sical information is accessible in at least two mutual unbi-
ased bases {|i〉} and {U |i〉}, this means that χ(ΛB(E0)) =
χ(ΛB(E1)) = log(q), hence I(τ : ΛB) ≥ 2 log(q) Moreover
from its definition we have I(τ : ΛB) ≤ 2 log(q). Hence
I(τ : ΛB) = 2 log(q), which means that the information is
quantumly accessible. 
We note that it is not true that a RCQ unauthorised set is
automatically QQ unauthorised, for example the (n, n) RCQ
threshold schemes [5, 8] are only (n, 0, n). However, as we
will see additional mixing can address this and further, for
pure state QQ the unauthorised sets exactly determined by the
authorised sets, so that the connection between QQ and RCQ
is exact.
We will now show that a valid access structure for a RCQ
protocol implies a secure key distribution.
Proposition 2. A RCQ authorised set is a RCQ secure set.
Proof: From proposition 1.3 a RCQ authorised set is QQ
authorised, hence there exists a decoding map ΓB . Then we
notice that the action of ΓB takes the channel state to a maxi-
mally entangled state between d and b′. To guarantee security
we can define the measurements {M t′B}qt′=0 as first B does
ΓB , then measures {Xtb′Zb′}q−1t=0 for t ∈ {0, ..., q − 1} or Xb′
if t = q. For security, one can consider the step ΓB simply
as part of the channel distributing the entangled state. The re-
maining part of the measurements coincide exactly with those
in the extended six state protocol in [20], hence security fol-
lows directly from there. Note that the same connection holds
if only two measurement settings were chosen, so in both di-
rections two settings are sufficient to show equivalence. How-
ever, more settings can allow for better noise tolerance [20].
See Fig. 2. Also, these measurements may not be the only
ones allowing for a secure protocol. Indeed, the measure-
ments in the RCQ schemes of [8, 9] are local, and not of the
form here, yet, the statistics can be shown to be equivalent and
security is still guaranteed.
Figure 2: (Color online) Schematic of the RCQ scheme for the secure
decoding. The channel state (1) is generated by the dealer sending
half an entangled state down the QQ encoding channel. The dealer
then randomly chooses t and measures in the associated basis, getting
result r(t). After tracing out of other systems to get ρB authorised
players B perform QQ decoding map ΓB , followed by a measure-
ment associated with a random value t′, getting result s(t′). The
strings r(t) and s(t′) are the raw strings from which the dealer and
players B can establish a secure random key using standard QKD
techniques [20].
We summarize these results in the table III.
From these results we can immediately see that the schemes
presented in [6] allowing for all QQ access structures can be
5RCQ QQ
(n, k, k′) → (n, k, n− k)
(n, k, k′ ≥ n− k) ← (n, k, n− k)
Table I: Relationships between RCQ and QQ protocols (Proposition
1).
used to give new RCQ protocols allowing for all access struc-
tures. Furthermore this can be done using high dimensional
graph states [22].
We note again at this point that the equivalence presented
here does not include all possible schemes for sharing classi-
cal secrets. This is clear since the equivalence presented also
implies access structures violating no-cloning cannot work for
RCQ schemes. In particular the use of QKD plus Shamir
schemes does not prohibit access structures with more than
one accessing set. Hence such schemes cannot be connected
in a simple way to QQ schemes. Indeed this fact (as well as
their possible intrinsic interest discussed at the end of this pa-
per), is why we concentrate on RCQ schemes, so that we may
make general, yet interesting statements of equivalence.
At this point we return to the question of dimensionality. In
fact, with a small modification to considering the RCQ pro-
tocol for only two bases (the t = 0 and t = q bases), propo-
sitions 1 and 2 work for all composite dimension also. This
follows from the proofs and the fact that the security in [20],
and lemma (4), works for any dimension by restricting to these
two bases.
IV. CONNECTION TO ERROR CORRECTION
We now clarify the relationship between QQ , RCQ and
quantum error correcting codes (QECC). A QECC encodes a
space of dimension κ onto n systems (or shares), such that
errors on some subsets of systems can be tolerated. A dis-
tance d means that the code can tolerate the loss of d − 1
shares (systems), or (d − 1)/2 arbitrary errors at unknown
locations. For shares of dimension q we denote a QECC as
((n, κ, d))q . Clearly one can use such an encoding as a QQ,
and in the language of ramp schemes, if each share is a player,
this means that k = n−d+1. Which players are unauthorised
is apriori not given for a code and must be checked (see e.g.
[23, 24]. Similarly it is clear that any QQ scheme is a QECC
with d = n− k + 1.
It was noticed in [6] that for the case of error correcting pro-
tocols encoding onto pure states, the situation becomes much
simpler. It turns out that in this case it can be seen that the
tolerance of a code to the loss of a set of shares BC is ex-
actly equivalent to the same set BC not getting any informa-
tion whatsoever about the encoded information. When used
for QQ this means its ramp scheme parameter is k′ ≤ n− k.
But by no cloning k′ ≥ n − k. Thus for all QQ with pure
state encodings k′ = n − k. For threshold schemes this re-
duces to k = (n + 1)/2 as was explicitly stated in [6] (see
also [24] for linear codes and [12] for uses and applications to
non-threshold schemes for qubits).
Furthermore, it gives a general relationship: a pure state
QECC protocol ((n, κ, d))q is equivalent to a QQ ramp
scheme where all shares are considered as players with pa-
rameters (k, k′ = n − k, n). That is all such QECC are QQ
ramp schemes with those parameters, and vice versa.
We can then ask what else is imposed by the relationship
with error correction. One important question is that of share
size. It can easily be seen that the Singleton bound implies
that for (perfect) threshold schemes with pure state encoding
κ ≤ q. Hence, when κ is a power of q, (as is the case for
many codes, including all stabiliser codes), the only non trivial
encoding satisfies κ = q and all pure state (perfect and ideal)
threshold schemes must be MDS codes (of dimension 1) (see
also [13] for a rigourous information theorical based proof in
both directions). This implies something that has been shown
for small n cases in [8], which is that, for all pure state perfect
threshold QQ secret sharing schemes encoding a secret equal
to the size of each share (that is ideal schemes), the dimension
of each share must scale with n,
q ≥
√
n+ 2
2
. (5)
This bound, as explained in [18], follows from the fact that the
code saturates the quantum Singleton bound. Moreover, the
quantum MDS conjecture for such codes, also cited in [18],
states that it would scale as badly as q ≥ √n− 1. This result
extends the bounded maximal length given by theorem 6 of
[12] to qudit systems.
We note that the above results need only hold for pure state
error correcting codes. The general schemes in this work
have used pure state encoding. However, as mentioned earlier,
mixed states encodings can also exist, though they will have
purifications which can be phrased in our framework (hence in
some sense they are also covered). It is interesting to consider
what exactly our results mean for the mixed state schemes.
The first thing that we can say is that the relationships be-
tween QQ and RCQ will still hold in the mixed case. We have
to be a bit careful by what we mean, but if we define both pro-
tocols in terms of the map ΓB from the original secret state
|ζ〉d′ held by the dealer to the encoded version held by set
of players B (whereby QQ is a direct use of ΓB and RCQ is
equivalent to the dealer sending half a maximally entangled
state through ΓB then doing the measurements) and take the
information theoretic definitions of authorised, unauthorised
and secure given in section II, the proofs for equivalence in
section III follow through directly.
On the other hand, there do of course exist mixed state
schemes which do not satisfy the error correction restrictions
for pure state schemes above. Indeed, as pointed out in [6], it
is possible to go from (k = n + 1/2, n) to (k, n − l) thresh-
old schemes by throwing away l systems. Clearly these mixed
schemes to not satisfy k′ = n−k. Such schemes were used in
[6] to show that all QQ threshold schemes can be achieved us-
ing quantum Reed Solomon codes. It is these schemes which
when translated to RCQ schemes (through our general rela-
tionship above) show all threshold (not violating no cloning)
schemes are possible for RCQ also. Note also that this ap-
6proach of discarding shares clearly holds in the RCQ exten-
sions presented in this work, hence a QQ (k, k′, n) mixed state
scheme implies a RCQ (k, k′, n) mixed state scheme.
Another set of schemes has been developed recently which
do not satisfy the dimension restriction (5) [24–27]. The idea
of these schemes is to take pure state error correcting schemes,
which are necessarily (k, k′ = n− k, n) ramp schemes, thus
guaranteed quantum access to at least k, and add classical
mixing on top to increase k′ arbitrarily (where classical in-
formation is distributed via classical secret sharing protocols
over secure channels). Since the original quantum codes are
no longer threshold schemes, they do not have to saturate the
Singleton bound, and hence do not have to satisfy (5). How-
ever, even in this case it seems there are some restrictions on
share size [26]. Note also that both these sets of schemes can
be purified, and their purifications clearly fall into our gener-
alized schemes and must satisfy the above still, and although
such purifications are impractical, this fact imposes restric-
tions on the mixed protocols also.
V. DISCUSSION
On the one hand, the error correction codes which were
used to provide arbitrary access structures for QQ [6], can,
through the generalised scheme presented here, be used for
RCQ, hence all access structures (not contracting the no
cloning theorem) become possible. In addition we have seen
that the mapping from QQ to RCQ allows for standard QKD
security proofs to be used, implying full security within the
authorised sets (where previously it was only known for lim-
ited attacks).
As was remarked in the introduction, applying simple QKD
plus existing classical secret sharing schemes solves the same
problem of an untrusted channel between the dealer and play-
ers as does RCQ. Nevertheless, we believe it interesting to
study the existence of RCQ protocols in their own right - aside
from the usefulness as a theoretical tool through the connec-
tion to QQ and QECC, they may be used as building blocks
for more involved protocols. For example one may imagine
using the redundancy of information present in RCQ in order
to realise a more noise tolerant bipartite QKD - all the shares
belong to one player Bob - so that Bob recover the informa-
tion in the presence of noise (including erasure), i.e. a kind of
quantum error corrected QKD. One may also imagine using
RCQ as a means to authenticate a quantum channel using an
authenticated classical channel - the only way that the correla-
tions shared at the end of the RCQ protocol (that is, correlated
measurement results), between the dealer and authorised set
B, can be correct (i.e. close to equal) is if the quantum chan-
nel is close to perfect between the dealer and B (indeed this
is the essence behind the link to QQ). This could be used in
combination with QQ as a way to test the channel and then
use it for QQ for example. In this setting having both schemes
using the same resources as presented here would make such
combinations more practical in terms of both implementation
and how they could be used together.
In the other direction, these results give a method for
searching for error correcting codes starting from RCQ
schemes. Checking the access structure (or error correcting
capability) for RCQ can be more straightforward than check-
ing the QQ case. We have seen that checking the access struc-
ture for only two bases suffices, for any dimensional system,
to guarantee access (tolerance to loss) for quantum informa-
tion too. In particular for graph state schemes, many tools
have recently been developed to phrase the conditions for se-
cret sharing in solely graphical language, which have been
used to search for new schemes [14, 22, 29, 30] which are
therefore valid QQ and QECC schemes, and put bounds on
the parameters that can be achieved. Through the general con-
nection shown in this work, such techniques can also be used
to search for quantum error correcting codes, in particular for
higher dimensional codes which are seen to be necessary for
the most efficient codes and general access structures.
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